Race and the Evaluation of Signal Callers in the National Football League
Authors:
- 1 February 2009
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Sports Economics
- Vol. 10 (1) , 23-43
Abstract
Until recently, the position of quarterback in the National Football League (NFL) was not an option for Black athletes. Today, many teams use Black quarterbacks, a development that might suggest race is no longer relevant when it comes to the evaluation of signal callers in the NFL. By modeling quarterback performance and salary over 1995-2006, we find that Black quarterbacks are more likely to run with the football, yet this skill is not compensated in the market. Furthermore, we find evidence of performance-related salary discrimination against Black quarterbacks in the top half of the salary distribution.Keywords
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