Credit, tenancy choice and agricultural efficiency: Evidence from the northern region of Bangladesh
Authors:
- Sayema Haque BidishaSBSayema Haque Bidisha
- Amzad HossainAHAmzad Hossain
- Rubaiyat AlamRARubaiyat Alam
- Mehedi HasanMHMehedi Hasan
- 1 March 2018
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Economic Analysis and Policy
- Vol. 57, 22-32
Abstract
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This publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
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