Testimonial Injustice
Author:
- Miranda FrickerMFMiranda Fricker
- 1 June 2007
- book chapter
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 9-29
Abstract
This chapter formulates a working definition of social power, and identifies and defines a sub-type — identity power. The first kind of epistemic injustice is explored: testimonial injustice, wherein a speaker receives an unfair deficit of credibility from a hearer owing to prejudice on the hearer's part. A distinction between systematic and incidental testimonial injustice is explained.Keywords
This publication has 39 references indexed in Scilit:
- Stereotypes as Explanations2002
- Free Speech and IllocutionLegal Theory, 1998
- The epistemology of testimonyStudies in History and Philosophy of Science, 1998
- Virtues of the Mind1996
- Making Sense of Humanity1995
- Moral Luck1981
- Power: A Radical View1974
- Problems of the Self1973
- Speech Acts1969
- Pygmalion in the classroomThe Urban Review, 1968