Loss aversion and competition in Vickrey auctions: Money ain't no good
- 1 May 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 115, 188-208
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- UTS (ARC-DE180100190)
- University of Sydney (ARC-DE150101032)
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