Private v. public antitrust enforcement: A strategic analysis
Authors:
- R. Preston McAfeeRMR. Preston McAfee
- Hugo M. MialonHMHugo M. Mialon
- Sue H. MialonSMSue H. Mialon
- 1 October 2008
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 92 (10-11) , 1863-1875
Abstract
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