Fodor, functions, physics, and fantasyland: is AI a Mickey Mouse discipline?
Author:
- Christopher D. GreenCGChristopher D. Green
- 1 January 1996
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 8 (1) , 95-106
Abstract
It is widely held that the methods of AI are the appropriate methods for cognitive science. Fodor, however, has argued that AI bears the same relation to psychology as Disneyland does to physics. This claim is examined in light of the widespread but paradoxical acceptance of the Turing Test—a behavioural criterion of intelligence—among advocates of cognitivism. It is argued that, given the recalcitrance of certain deep conceptual problems in psychology, and disagreements concerning psychology's basic vocabulary, it is unlikely that AI will prove to be very psychologically enlightening until some consensus on ontological issues in psychology is achieved.Keywords
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