The Sopranos Redux: The Empirical Economics of Waste Crime
Authors:
- 26 June 2010
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Illegal waste disposal is one of the most important environmental problems worldwide. An increasing number of countries apply criminal sanctioning to environmental offenders, based on the notion, but without any evidence that such sanctions provide deterrence. The present paper studies the determinants of waste crime in one German state. Using panel data the paper finds evidence in support of the deterrence hypothesis, especially for the first stages of enforcement. At the same time, deterrence is modulated by additional factors: Violations appear to be treated differently depending on their local political economy context.Keywords
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