(Un)fair Delegation: Exploring the Strategic Use of Equity Rules in International Climate Negotiations
Authors:
- 25 March 2017
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 67 (3) , 505-533
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DE)
- Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (DE)
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