The effect of shareholder activism on earnings management: Evidence from shareholder proposals
Authors:
- Jeffrey NgJNJeffrey Ng
- Hong WuHWHong Wu
- Weihuan ZhaiWZWeihuan Zhai
- Jing ZhaoJZJing Zhao
- 1 August 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Corporate Finance
- Vol. 69
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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