Epistemic Injustice
Top Cited Papers
- 28 July 2016
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy Compass
- Vol. 11 (8) , 437-446
Abstract
There's been a great deal of interest in epistemology regarding what it takes for a hearer to come to know on the basis of a speaker's say‐so. That is, there's been much work on the epistemology of testimony. However, what about when hearers don't believe speakers when they should? In other words, what are we to make of when testimony goes wrong? A recent topic of interest in epistemology and feminist philosophy is how we sometimes fail to believe speakers due to inappropriate prejudices – implicit or explicit. This is known as epistemic injustice . In this article, I discuss Miranda Fricker's groundbreaking work on epistemic injustice, as well as more recent developments that both offer critique and expansion on the nature and extent of epistemic injustice.Keywords
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