Impression Management and the Biasing of Executive Pay Benchmarks: A Dynamic Analysis
Authors:
- Mathijs de VaanMVMathijs de Vaan
- Thomas A. DiPreteTDThomas A. DiPrete
Preprint
- 1 January 2014
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We study the selection of peers into compensation peer groups reported by U.S. corporations. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation requires firmsKeywords
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