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Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
Home
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Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
Author:
HM
H. Reiju Mihara
H. Reiju Mihara
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4 May 2000
journal article
Published by
Springer Nature
in
Social Choice and Welfare
Vol. 17
(3)
,
393-402
DOI:
10.1007/s003550050170
Abstract
No abstract available
Keywords
BOOLEAN ALGEBRA
SOCIAL CHOICE
CHOICE FUNCTION
EXTENSION THEOREM
SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTION
All Related Versions
Version 1, RePEc (Unconfirmed version)
Cited
Cited by 23 articles
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