Health insurance theory: the case of the missing welfare gain
Author:
- 4 December 2007
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in The European Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 9 (4) , 369-380
Abstract
An important source of value is missing from the conventional welfare analysis of moral hazard, namely, the effect of income transfers (from those who purchase insurance and remain healthy to those who become ill) on purchases of medical care. Income transfers are contained within the price reduction that is associated with standard health insurance. However, in contrast to the income effects contained within an exogenous price decrease, these income transfers act to shift out the demand for medical care. As a result, the consumer’s willingness to pay for medical care increases and the resulting additional consumption is welfare increasing.Keywords
This publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
- Covering The Uninsured: What Is It Worth?Health Affairs, 2004
- The Welfare Economics of Moral HazardInternational Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, 2001
- Chapter 11 The anatomy of health insurance2000
- The economics of moral hazard revisitedJournal of Health Economics, 1999
- Health insurance: The tradeoff between risk pooling and moral hazardJournal of Health Economics, 1996
- When Does Curbing Health Costs Really Help the Economy?Health Affairs, 1995
- More on moral hazardJournal of Health Economics, 1983
- Health insurance and the demand for medical careJournal of Health Economics, 1983
- The Welfare Loss of Excess Health InsuranceJournal of Political Economy, 1973
- The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving RiskJournal of Political Economy, 1948