Notice of Violation of IEEE Publication Principles: Data Trading with a Monopoly Social Network: Outcomes Are Mostly Privacy Welfare Damaging
- 16 October 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Networking Letters
- Vol. 2 (4) , 185-189
Abstract
This paper argues that data of strategic individuals with heterogeneous privacy valuations in a distributed online social network (e.g., Facebook) will be under-priced, if traded in a monopoly buyer setting, and will lead to diminishing utilitarian welfare. This result, for a certain family of online community data trading problems, is in stark contrast to a popular information economics intuition that increased amounts of end-user data signals in a data market improves its efficiency. Our proposed theory paves the way for a future (counter-intuitive) analysis of data trading oligopoly markets for online social networks (OSNs).Keywords
Funding Information
- NSF (CNS-1616575, CNS-1939006, CNS-2012001)
- ARO (W911NF1810208)
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