Entry regulation and the effect of public reporting: Evidence from Home Health Compare
- 28 January 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 28 (4) , 492-516
Abstract
Economic theory suggests that competition and information are complementary tools for promoting health care quality. The existing empirical literature has documented this effect only in the context of competition among existing firms. Extending this literature, we examine competition driven by the entry of new firms into the home health care industry. In particular, we use the certificate of need (CON) law as a proxy for the entry of firms to avoid potential endogeneity of entry. We find that home health agencies in non‐CON states improved quality under public reporting significantly more than agencies in CON states. Because home health care is a labor‐intensive and capital‐light industry, the state CON law is a major barrier for new firms to enter. Our findings suggest that policymakers may jointly consider information disclosure and entry regulation to achieve better quality in home health care.Keywords
Funding Information
- NIH/National Institute on Aging (1R03AG035098-01)
- NIH/National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (R01 HL088586-01)
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