THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL FORCES: EVIDENCE FROM THE BEHAVIOR OF FOOTBALL REFEREES
- 1 July 2008
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 46 (3) , 411-424
Abstract
Analyzing the neutrality of referees during 12 German premier league (1. Bundesliga) soccer seasons, this paper documents evidence that social forces influence agents’ decisions. Referees, who are appointed to be impartial, tend to favor the home team by systematically awarding more stoppage time in close matches in which the home team is behind. They also favor the home team in decisions to award goals and penalty kicks. Crowd composition affects the size and the direction of the bias, and the crowd’s proximity to the field is related to the quality of refereeing. (JEL J00)Keywords
This publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
- An Economic Analysis of "Acting White"*The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2005
- Favoritism Under Social PressureReview of Economics and Statistics, 2005
- Favoritism of agents – The case of referees' home biasJournal of Economic Psychology, 2004
- Winning Isn’t Everything: Corruption in Sumo WrestlingAmerican Economic Review, 2002
- Social Norms and Moral HazardThe Economic Journal, 2001
- Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and EvidenceJournal of Political Economy, 2001
- Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female MusiciansAmerican Economic Review, 2000
- Favoritism in OrganizationsJournal of Political Economy, 1996
- A Theory of ConformityJournal of Political Economy, 1994
- A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One ConsequenceThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1980