A bottom-up institutional approach to cooperative governance of risky commons
Top Cited Papers
- 14 July 2013
- journal article
- letter
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Climate Change
- Vol. 3 (9) , 797-801
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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