On offense history and the theory of deterrence
Authors:
- A.MItchell PolinskyAPA.MItchell Polinsky
- Steven ShavellSSSteven Shavell
Open Access
- 1 September 1998
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Law and Economics
- Vol. 18 (3) , 305-324
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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