Efficiency of continuous double auctions under individual evolutionary learning with full or limited information
Open Access
- 27 May 2011
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Evolutionary Economics
- Vol. 23 (3) , 539-573
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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