The Thesis of Theory-Laden Observation in the Light of Cognitive Psychology
Author:
- Anna EstanyAEAnna Estany
- 1 June 2001
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 68 (2) , 203-217
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyze a philosophical question (neutrality vs. theoryladenness of observation) taking into consideration the empirical results of Cognitive Psychology (theories of perception). This is an important debate because the objectivity of science is at stake. In the Philosophy of Science there are two main positions with regard to observation, those of C. Hempel and N. R. Hanson. In the Philosophy of Mind there are also two important contrasting positions, those of J. Fodor and Paul M. Churchland. I will analyze the consequences of recent theories of perception and vision developed within Cognitive Science for classical epistemological theses about observation.Keywords
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