Informational Approach to Intergenerational Resource Sharing
- 1 May 1998
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Energy Sources
- Vol. 20 (4-5) , 333-342
Abstract
Given an exhaustible resource whose stock size is unknown, a major normative resource management problem is to distribute this stock over different generations using a sound ethical rule. We formulate the complex relationship between different generations in the framework of the classical optimization problem in agency theory. The model brings out the important role played by informational asymmetry in the intergenerational resource sharing problem.Keywords
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