Information leakage chaff
Open Access
- 7 June 2015
- conference paper
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-6
Abstract
A prominent threat to embedded systems security is represented by side-channel attacks: they have proven effective in breaching confidentiality, violating trust guarantees and IP protection schemes. State-of-the-art countermeasures reduce the leaked information to prevent the attacker from retrieving the secret key of the cipher. We propose an alternate defense strategy augmenting the regular information leakage with false targets, quite like chaff countermeasures against radars, hiding the correct secret key among a volley of chaff targets. This in turn feeds the attacker with a large amount of invalid keys, which can be used to trigger an alarm whenever the attack attempts a content forgery using them, thus providing a reactive security measure. We realized a LLVM compiler pass able to automatically apply the proposed countermeasure to software implementations of block ciphers. We provide effectiveness and efficiency results on an AES implementation running on an ARM Cortex-M4 showing performance overheads comparable with state-of-the-art countermeasures.Keywords
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