Formal analysis of an AUTOSAR-based basic software module
Open Access
- 5 August 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer
- Vol. 26 (4) , 495-508
Abstract
The widespread use of advanced driver assistance systems in modern vehicles, together with their integration with the Internet and other road nodes, has made vehicle more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. To address these risks, the automotive industry is increasingly focusing on the development of security solutions: formal methods and software verification techniques, which have been successfully applied to a number of safety-critical systems, could be a promising approach in the automotive area. In this work, we concentrate on in-vehicle communications, provided by many Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that work together thanks to serial protocols such as Controller Area Network (CAN). However, increasing connectivity exposes the internal network to a variety of cyber-risks. Our aim is to formally verify the AUTOSAR-based Basic Software module called CINNAMON, designed to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and authentication at the same time for traffic exchanged over CAN protocol. More precisely, it adds confidentiality guarantees to the Secure Onboard Communication (SecOC) module. We formally analyze CINNAMON with the verification tool Tamarin. Our analysis shows that CINNAMON could be an effective security solution, as it can ensure the desired properties, in particular, confidentiality in a send-receive scenario between two ECUs. Finally, we describe a potential application scenario.Keywords
Funding Information
- Università di Pisa
This publication has 24 references indexed in Scilit:
- A manifesto for applicable formal methodsSoftware and Systems Modeling, 2023
- Formal verification for security and attacks in IoT physical layerJournal of Reliable Intelligent Environments, 2023
- Designing and implementing an AUTOSAR-based Basic Software Module for enhanced securityComputer Networks, 2022
- Formal Methods to Analyze Energy Efficiency and Security for IoT: A Systematic Review2021
- Towards formal verification of IoT protocols: A ReviewComputer Networks, 2020
- Formal Verification in Automotive Industry: Enablers and Obstacles2018
- A Proposal of an Example and Experiments Repository to Foster Industrial Adoption of Formal Methods2018
- Formal Security Analysis of the MaCAN Protocol2014
- The TAMARIN Prover for the Symbolic Analysis of Security Protocols2013
- Role of Formal Methods in the Automobile Industry2007