Free will expressivism
Authors:
Open Access
- 11 July 2025
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 206 (1) , 1-28
Abstract
In this paper I argue for free will expressivism, the view that the best interpretation of what people are doing when they utter free will sentences is not, as cognitivists maintain, asserting truth apt propositions, but rather, expressing attitudes towards the performance of certain actions. I argue that free will expressivism has several advantages over its cognitivist rivals in making sense of our free will discourse, and that this is good reason to interpret people thusly.Keywords
Funding Information
- University of Sydney
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