An Open Framework for the Reproducible Study of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Authors:
- Vincent KnightVKVincent Knight
- Owen CampbellOCOwen Campbell
- Marc HarperMHMarc Harper
- Karol LangnerKLKarol Langner
- James CampbellJCJames Campbell
- Thomas CampbellTCThomas Campbell
- Alex CarneyACAlex Carney
- Martin ChorleyMCMartin Chorley
- Cameron Davidson-PilonCDCameron Davidson-Pilon
- Kristian GlassKGKristian Glass
- Nikoleta GlynatsiNGNikoleta Glynatsi
- Tomáš EhrlichTETomáš Ehrlich
Open Access
- 27 January 2016
- journal article
- Published by Ubiquity Press, Ltd. in Journal of Open Research Software
- Vol. 4 (1) , 35
Abstract
The Axelrod library is an open source Python package that allows for reproducible game theoretic research into the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. This area of research began in the 1980s but suffers from a lack of documentation and test code. The goal of the library is to provide such a resource, with facilities for the design of new strategies and interactions between them, as well as conducting tournaments and ecological simulations for populations of strategies. With a growing collection of 139 strategies, the library is a also a platform for an original tournament that, in itself, is of interest to the game theoretic community. This paper describes the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Axelrod library and its development, and insights gained from some novel researchKeywords
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