Debt Maturity and Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Default Risk Changes
- 24 May 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 48 (3) , 789-817
Abstract
Asymmetric information models suggest that a borrower’s choice of debt maturity depends on its private information about its default probabilities, that is, borrowers with favorable information prefer short-term debt while those with unfavorable information prefer long-term debt. We test this implication by tracing the evolution of debt issuers’ default risk following debt issuances. We find that short-term debt issuance leads to a decline inborrowers’ asset volatility and an increase in their distance to default. The opposite is true for long-term debt issues. The results suggest that borrowers’ private information about their default risk is an important determinant of their debt maturity choices.Keywords
This publication has 31 references indexed in Scilit:
- Does industry-wide distress affect defaulted firms? Evidence from creditor recoveriesJournal of Financial Economics, 2007
- So what do I get? The bank's view of lending relationshipsJournal of Financial Economics, 2007
- Lending to small businesses: the role of loan maturity in addressing information problemsSmall Business Economics, 2007
- How rating agencies achieve rating stabilityJournal of Banking & Finance, 2004
- The maturity of debt issues and predictable variation in bond returnsJournal of Financial Economics, 2003
- Debt Maturity and the Effects of Growth Opportunities and Liquidity Risk on LeverageThe Review of Financial Studies, 2003
- Corporate Call Policy for Nonconvertible BondsThe Journal of Business, 2000
- The long-run performance of stock returns following debt offeringsJournal of Financial Economics, 1999
- Industry costs of equityJournal of Financial Economics, 1997
- The Determinants of Corporate Debt Maturity StructureThe Journal of Business, 1996