Collapse of cooperation in evolving games
- 24 November 2014
- journal article
- research article
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 111 (49) , 17558-17563
Abstract
Significance: This study offers a new perspective on an age-old question: When does cooperation emerge in populations? Two-player games used to study this question produce an array of counterintuitive results. And yet a consensus has emerged that, in an evolving population, cooperation tends to triumph over cheating––through reciprocity and generosity. But, what happens when players can influence not only their tendencies to cooperate, but also the rewards they reap for cooperation? We analyze coevolution of strategies and payoffs and find that, as individuals maximize the benefits of cooperation, they often pave the way for its collapse. Our analysis provides a framework for studying the coevolution of games and strategies, and suggests that maintaining cooperation may be more difficult than previously thought.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 47 references indexed in Scilit:
- From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s DilemmaProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2013
- Accelerated crossing of fitness valleys through division of labor and cheating in asexual populationsScientific Reports, 2012
- Public good dynamics drive evolution of iron acquisition strategies in natural bacterioplankton populationsProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2012
- Adaptation to a new environment allows cooperators to purge cheaters stochasticallyProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2012
- Extortion and cooperation in the Prisoner’s DilemmaProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2012
- Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponentProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2012
- Emergence of stable polymorphisms driven by evolutionary games between mutantsNature Communications, 2012
- Snowdrift game dynamics and facultative cheating in yeastNature, 2009
- Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2007
- Evolution of cooperation among tumor cellsProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2006