A moral solution to the moral hazard problem
Authors:
- Douglas E. StevensDSDouglas E. Stevens
- Alex ThevaranjanATAlex Thevaranjan
- 1 January 2010
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Accounting, Organizations and Society
- Vol. 35 (1) , 125-139
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 21 references indexed in Scilit:
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