Strategic R&D and the innovation of products: understanding the role of time preferences and product differentiation
- 6 November 2016
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Economics of Innovation and New Technology
- Vol. 26 (7) , 575-595
Abstract
We evaluate the effects of innovation on competition using an optimal control approach that incorporates firms' time preferences. Using a model where firm(s) innovates by investing in research and development to create a more appealing product for heterogeneous consumers, we examine conditions that maximize social welfare. When firm(s) choose discount rate regardless of market structure, a monopoly will develop more innovative products. However, we show that duopolies may increase innovation if competition alters firms' outlook. Finally, we identify firm incentives to behave myopically, which in the context of collusion may impede industry-wide innovation.Keywords
This publication has 25 references indexed in Scilit:
- Product Innovation Incentives: Monopoly vs. CompetitionJournal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2013
- INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE IN OLIGOPOLIESThe Manchester School, 2010
- PRODUCT QUALITY AND MARKET SIZE*The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2010
- Cooperation through imitationGames and Economic Behavior, 2009
- Dynamic R&D with spillovers: Competition vs cooperationJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2009
- Process and Product Innovation: Complementarity in a Vertically Differentiated Monopoly with Discrete Consumer TypesThe Japanese Economic Review, 2004
- The Free-Market Innovation Machine2002
- Intensity of competition and the choice between product and process innovationInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 1998
- Optimal dynamic policies for product and process innovationJournal of Operations Management, 1995
- Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention1962