Strategic Complementarity, Fragility, and Regulation
Author:
- 1 January 2011
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
The paper analyzes a very stylized model of crises and demonstrates how the degree of strategic complementarity in the actions of investors is a critical determinant of fragility. It is shown how the balance sheet composition of a financial intermediary, parameters of the information structure (precisions of public and private information), and the level of stress indicators in the market impinge on the degree of strategic complementarity. The model distinguishes between solvency and liquidity risk and characterizes them. Both a solvency (leverage) and a liquidity ratio are required to control the probabilities of insolvency and illiquidity. It is found that in a more competitive environment (with higher return on short-term debt) the solvency requirement has to be strengthened, and in an environment where the fire sales penalty is higher and fund managers are more conservative the liquidity requirement has to be strengthened while the solvency one relaxed. Higher disclosure or introducing a derivatives market may backfire, aggravating fragility (in particular when the asset side of a financial intermediary is opaque) and, correspondingly, liquidity requirements should be tightened. The model is applied to interpret the 2007 run on SIV and ABCP conduits.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 61 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Collapse of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper MarketSSRN Electronic Journal, 2012
- Rollover Risk: Optimal But InefficientSSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
- Securitization, Transparency and LiquiditySSRN Electronic Journal, 2010
- Competition and Stability in BankingSSRN Electronic Journal, 2010
- The Bear's Lair: Indexed Credit Default Swaps and the Subprime Mortgage CrisisSSRN Electronic Journal, 2009
- Too many to fail—An analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policiesJournal of Financial Intermediation, 2007
- An Experimental Exploration of Self‐Fulfilling Banking Panics: Their Occurrence, Persistence, and Prevention*The Journal of Business, 2006
- Competition and Financial StabilityJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2004
- Competition for Deposits, Fragility, and InsuranceJournal of Financial Intermediation, 1996
- Bank Runs as an Equilibrium PhenomenonJournal of Political Economy, 1987