Knowledge Market Design: A Field Experiment at Google Answers
- 19 July 2010
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 12 (4) , 641-664
Abstract
In a field experiment at Google Answers, we investigate the performance of price‐based online knowledge markets by systematically manipulating prices. Specifically, we study the effects of price, tip, and a reputation system on both an answerer's effort and answer quality by posting real reference questions from the Internet Public Library on Google Answers under different pricing schemes. We find that a higher price leads to a significantly longer, but not better, answer, while an answerer with a higher reputation provides significantly better answers. Our results highlight the limitation of monetary incentives and the importance of reputation systems in knowledge market design.Keywords
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