Performance Measure Manipulation*
Author:
- 1 September 1998
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 15 (3) , 261-285
Abstract
A two‐period model in which communication restrictions preclude the usual revelation representation is analyzed, and the communication policies take on the appearance of “income smoothing.” The driving force is the information content of the “smoothed” or manipulated series, relative to its counterpart were manipulation not possible. Various possibilities arise, depending on the underlying stochastic structure: performance measure manipulation might be socially efficient, or not; and when it is best to invite and motivate this manipulation, the optimal policy itself can take on a variety of forms.Keywords
This publication has 30 references indexed in Scilit:
- Smoothing income in anticipation of future earningsJournal of Accounting and Economics, 1997
- Discretionary behavior with respect to allowances for loan losses and the behavior of security pricesJournal of Accounting and Economics, 1996
- What motivates managers' choice of discretionary accruals?Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1996
- Multiple Control Systems, Accrual Accounting, and Earnings ManagementJournal of Accounting Research, 1996
- Earnings management and firm valuation under asymmetric informationJournal of Corporate Finance, 1995
- Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accrualsJournal of Accounting and Economics, 1994
- Communication in Multiperiod Agencies with Production and Financial Decisions*Contemporary Accounting Research, 1993
- Earnings Management in an Overlapping Generations ModelJournal of Accounting Research, 1988
- Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency modelsJournal of Economic Theory, 1985
- The Return to Straight-Line Depreciation: An Analysis of a Change in Accounting MethodJournal of Accounting Research, 1967