Identifying social norms using coordination games: Spectators vs. stakeholders
Authors:
- Hande ErkutHEHande Erkut
- Daniele NosenzoDNDaniele Nosenzo
- Martin SeftonMSMartin Sefton
Open Access
- 1 May 2015
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 130, 28-31
Abstract
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Funding Information
- Economic and Social Science Research Council (ES/K002201/1)
- Graduate School of Business and Economics at Maastricht University
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