Leadership in singleton congestion games: What is hard and what is easy
Authors:
- Matteo CastiglioniMCMatteo Castiglioni
- Alberto MarchesiAMAlberto Marchesi
- Nicola GattiNGNicola Gatti
- Stefano ConiglioSCStefano Coniglio
- 1 December 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 277
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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Funding Information
- Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca
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