Public Policy Toward Pecuniary Externalities
Authors:
- 1 July 2001
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Public Finance Review
- Vol. 29 (4) , 304-325
Abstract
Pecuniary externalities create third-party effects through changes in relative prices or asset prices. Unlike technological externalities, they do not misallocate resources and are necessary for the market to work efficiently. However, the political process does not differentiate pecuniary from technological externalities and often tries to prevent pecuniary externalities, which creates resource misallocations. The article shows how pecuniary externalities function in markets, why the political process takes account of pecuniary externalities, and why public policy toward pecuniary externalities results in resource misallocations.Keywords
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