On the Profitability of Selfish Mining Attack Under the Checkpoint Mechanism
Authors:
- 4 December 2023
- conference paper
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 898-903
Abstract
Though designed with security in mind, blockchains are vulnerable to various kinds of attacks, especially when the network computational power is low. Selfish mining is one of the most rudimentary and notorious attacks, which maliciously renders blocks found by honest miners orphaned by strategically withholding and revealing the found blocks. In this paper, we analyze the profitability of selfish mining under the checkpoint mechanism—a mechanism that has been adopted as a finality gadget by many blockchains like Ethereum and Bitcoin Cash. We develop a rigorous analysis method and conduct quantitative evaluations in various scenarios to explore the mechanism's suppression effect on selfish mining. The results illustrate that the checkpoint mechanism can restrict the profit of selfish mining and increase the threshold of computational power that makes selfish mining profitable, suggesting that it is a practical defense mechanism against selfish mining.Keywords
This publication has 16 references indexed in Scilit:
- Securing Proof-of-Work Ledgers via Checkpointing2021
- How to Model the Bribery Attack: A Practical Quantification Method in Blockchain2020
- Incentives in Ethereum's hybrid Casper protocolInternational Journal of Network Management, 2020
- Ouroboros Praos: An Adaptively-Secure, Semi-synchronous Proof-of-Stake Blockchain2018
- Incentivizing Blockchain Forks via Whale Transactions2017
- Ouroboros: A Provably Secure Proof-of-Stake Blockchain Protocol2017
- Optimal Selfish Mining Strategies in Bitcoin2017
- Why Buy When You Can Rent?2016
- Stubborn Mining: Generalizing Selfish Mining and Combining with an Eclipse Attack2016
- Majority Is Not Enough: Bitcoin Mining Is Vulnerable2014