Designing Secure and Dependable Mobile Sensing Mechanisms With Revenue Guarantees
Authors:
- 14 September 2015
- journal article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 11 (1) , 100-113
Abstract
In many existing incentive-based mobile sensing applications, the sensing job owner runs an auction with the mobile phone users to maximize its purchased sensing resource. We notice that both the mobile phone users and the job owner could behave dishonestly to pursue their own interests. This motivates us to design secure and dependable auction mechanisms that generate the correct, promising output even when both of them could cheat. In particular, in this paper, we consider a general auction in which a buyer, who acts as the auctioneer, purchases the resource under a limited budget from a group of sellers who act as the bidders. Considering bidders' privacy and their limited computing capacity, we construct our mechanisms by integrating the innovative game theoretical techniques, logic deductions, and efficient cryptographic operations. Our mechanisms are not only proved to be strategy-proof against dishonest bidders in the sense that they are incentivized to bid their private types truthfully, but also enable all the bidders to efficiently verify the correctness of the auction's outcome, that is computed by the auctioneer, without revealing their private types to each other. Meanwhile, our mechanisms are proved to have the theoretical guarantee that the auctioneer/buyer's expected revenue (i.e. the amount of service it acquires after the auction) is no less than a certain portion of the optimal revenue that the auctioneer can acquire when it knows all the bidders' types at no cost. Our extensive evaluations show that our mechanisms achieve good performance in terms of the revenue maximization and their efficiency.Keywords
Funding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (61321491, 61425024, 61300235, 61402223)
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