Macro prudential governance and central banks: Facts and drivers
Authors:
- Donato MasciandaroDMDonato Masciandaro
- Alessio VolpicellaAVAlessio Volpicella
- 1 March 2016
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Money and Finance
- Vol. 61, 101-119
Abstract
No abstract availableFunding Information
- Baffi Carefin Centre
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