Optimal punishment when individuals may learn deviant values
Authors:
- In-Gyu KimIKIn-Gyu Kim
- 1 September 2001
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Law and Economics
- Vol. 21 (3) , 271-285
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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