The structure of ownership and corporate acquisition strategies
Authors:
- 29 November 2001
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 23 (1) , 41-53
Abstract
In this study, we examine in an agency‐theoretic context the influence of executive equity stakes upon corporate strategy and firm value. We argue that beneficial, risk‐increasing corporate strategies may initially be emphasized but non‐value‐maximizing, risk‐reducing strategies may subsequently be emphasized as managers expand their stock ownership. We alternatively contend that stock options may have a consistently positive impact on firm risk taking and acquisition returns. The empirical findings are supportive of our expectations. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Keywords
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