Abstract
The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 took most of the international academic community by surprise despite persistent warnings from US intelligence because it made little sense strategically, politically, and especially economically. The justification for the invasion was outlined in two speeches by Vladimir Putin, one on 21 February 2022 and the other on the opening day of the invasion. The first – and the longer – speech deprioritised the perceived threat of NATO expansion; instead, Putin went to great lengths communicating his visions of Ukrainian history as inseparable from the history of Russia, and of Ukrainian independence as a historical aberration. Speaking in a pidgin of social constructivism (Ukrainian identity as an artificial construct) and essentialism (references to the historical “unity” of Russian and Ukrainian people), Putin declared that one of the main crimes of the Ukrainian Western-oriented politicians was “that they started building the [Ukrainian] statehood by negating everything that unites us, sought to distort the historical consciousness, historical memory of millions of people, entire generations that lived in Ukraine” (Putin 2022).