When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus
- 3 April 2017
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 96 (1) , 142-156
Abstract
It is often suggested that disagreement among scientific experts is a reason not to trust those experts, even about matters on which they are in agreement. In direct opposition to this view, I argue here that the very fact that there is disagreement among experts on a given issue provides a positive reason for non-experts to trust that the experts really are justified in their attitudes towards consensus theories. I show how this line of thought can be spelled out in three distinct frameworks for non-deductive reasoning: namely, Bayesian Confirmation Theory, Inference to the Best Explanation, and Inferential Robustness Analysis.Keywords
Funding Information
- Irish Research Council (REPRO/2015/89)
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