Dynamic Investment and Financing under Personal Taxation
Authors:
- Erwan MorellecEMErwan Morellec
- Norman SchürhoffNSNorman Schürhoff
- 11 August 2009
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 23 (1) , 101-146
Abstract
In this paper we examine the effects of capital gains taxation on firms' investment and financing decisions. We develop a real-options model in which the timing of investment, the decision to default, and the firm's capital structure are endogenously and jointly determined. Our analysis demonstrates that the asymmetric taxation of capital gains and losses fosters investment by eroding the option value of waiting. It also shows that firms controlled by taxable investors employ more equity financing, the higher the firm's stock price and the worse the firm's historical performance. Using a large sample of U.S. industrial firms that are owned by taxable investors between 1970 and 2008, we present new evidence on corporate investment and financing policies, which is supportive of the model's predictions.Keywords
This publication has 39 references indexed in Scilit:
- Capital Gains Taxes and Asset Prices: Capitalization or Lock‐in?The Journal of Finance, 2008
- The timing of initial public offeringsJournal of Financial Economics, 2005
- Shareholder Taxes in Acquisition Premiums: The Effect of Capital Gains TaxationThe Journal of Finance, 2003
- International Asset Allocation With Regime ShiftsThe Review of Financial Studies, 2002
- Market Timing and Capital StructureThe Journal of Finance, 2002
- Debt Valuation, Renegotiation, and Optimal Dividend PolicyThe Review of Financial Studies, 2000
- Is There a Window of Opportunity for Seasoned Equity Issuance?The Journal of Finance, 1996
- Financing Constraints and Corporate InvestmentBrookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1988
- Capital Market Equilibrium with Personal TaxEconometrica, 1983
- Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Cyclical InvestmentThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1983