Transparency and the Mindfulness Opacity Hypothesis
Authors:
- 20 October 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Philosophical Quarterly
- Vol. 74 (3) , 822-843
Abstract
Many philosophers endorse the Transparency Thesis, the claim that by introspection one cannot become aware of one's experience. Recently, some authors have suggested that the Transparency Thesis is challenged by introspective states reached under mindfulness. We label this the Mindfulness Opacity Hypothesis. The present paper develops the hypothesis in important new ways. First, we motivate the hypothesis by drawing on recent clinical psychology and cognitive science of mindfulness. Secondly, we develop the hypothesis by describing the implied shift in experiential perspective, the scope of introspectable qualities, and the level of skill. Thirdly, we defend the hypothesis against various philosophical arguments. We conclude that the Mindfulness Opacity Hypothesis is empirically and theoretically well motivated and supported.Keywords
Funding Information
- DFF
- FKK (0132-00141B)
This publication has 61 references indexed in Scilit:
- Cognitive factors correlating with the metacognition of the phenomenal properties of experienceScientific Reports, 2013
- Neural mechanisms of attentional control in mindfulness meditationFrontiers in Neuroscience, 2013
- Meditation Experience Predicts Introspective AccuracyPLOS ONE, 2012
- Open, Aware, and Active: Contextual Approaches as an Emerging Trend in the Behavioral and Cognitive TherapiesAnnual Review of Clinical Psychology, 2011
- Attention regulation and monitoring in meditationTrends in Cognitive Sciences, 2008
- Mechanisms of mindfulnessJournal of Clinical Psychology, 2005
- Précis of Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self‐Knowledge*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2004
- The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for Representational Theories of ConsciousnessNoûs, 1998
- On Knowing One's Own MindPhilosophical Perspectives, 1988
- Epistemological Foundations for a Materialist Theory of the MindPhilosophy of Science, 1973