Peer-to-peer networks offer a cost effective and easily deployable framework for sharing user-generated content. However, peer-to-peer networks have intrinsic incentive problems in that the transfer of content incurs costs both to the uploader and to the downloader while it benefits only the downloader. We investigate fundamental issues on incentives in content production and sharing using a game theoretic model. We analyze our model with five different approaches: cooperative, non-cooperative, repeated interaction, pricing schemes, and enforced full sharing. Using these approaches, we show that (1) peers share all produced content at a cooperative solution whereas they do not share at all at a non-cooperative solution; (2) each peer consumes more content at a cooperative solution than at a non-cooperative solution; (3) a cooperative outcome can be achieved among non-cooperative peers if repeated interaction or a pricing scheme is utilized; and (4) enforced full sharing has ambiguous welfare effects on peers. In addition to providing the solutions of our model from different approaches, we discuss from a protocol designer's point of view the requirements of each solution concept in terms of the enforceability of peers' sharing decisions by the protocol designer and the level of knowledge needed for the protocol designer and peers.