Penalty and Crime: Further Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence
Author:
- George TsebelisGTGeorge Tsebelis
- 1 July 1993
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Vol. 5 (3) , 349-374
Abstract
Two different models of the game between police and public, one with two-sided incomplete information and the other with multiple strategies, lead to the same results as my previous research: changes in penalties at equilibrium do not affect crime but instead affect police behavior. I compare these models with alternative models of the police-public game which come to different conclusions. I provide reasons for the differences in the conclusions, as well as empirical evidence against which the different models can be evaluated.Keywords
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