Stock options and managerial incentives for risk taking: Evidence from FAS 123R
Authors:
- Rachel M. HayesRHRachel M. Hayes
- Michael LemmonMLMichael Lemmon
- Mingming QiuMQMingming Qiu
Top Cited Papers
- 1 July 2012
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 105 (1) , 174-190
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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