Incentive Compatible Cost Sharing of a Coalition Initiative with Probabilistic Inspection and Penalties for Misrepresentation
- 1 September 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Group Decision and Negotiation
- Vol. 29 (6) , 1021-1055
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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