Conspiracy Theories and Fortuitous Data
Authors:
- 24 May 2010
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Philosophy of the Social Sciences
- Vol. 40 (4) , 567-578
Abstract
We offer a particularist defense of conspiratorial thinking. We explore the possibility that the presence of a certain kind of evidence—what we call “fortuitous data”—lends rational credence to conspiratorial thinking. In developing our argument, we introduce conspiracy theories and motivate our particularist approach (§1). We then introduce and define fortuitous data (§2). Lastly, we locate an instance of fortuitous data in one real world conspiracy, the Watergate scandal (§3).Keywords
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