Motivational Approaches to Intellectual Vice
Author:
- 12 December 2017
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 96 (4) , 753-766
Abstract
Despite the now considerable literature on intellectual virtue, there remains relatively little philosophical discussion of intellectual vice. What discussion there is has been shaped by a powerful assumption—that, just as intellectual virtue requires that we are motivated by epistemic goods, intellectual vice requires that we aren't. In this paper, I demonstrate that this assumption is false: motivational approaches cannot explain a range of intuitive cases of intellectual vice. The popularity of the assumption is accounted for by its being a manifestation of a more general understanding of vice as an inversion or mirror image of virtue. I call this the inversion thesis, and argue that the failure of the motivational approach to vice exposes its limitations. I conclude by suggesting that recognizing these limitations can help to encourage philosophical interest in intellectual vice.Keywords
Funding Information
- White Rose College of the Arts and Humanities (149511717)
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